Three Myths about Kant's Second Antinomy (forthcoming in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie)

This paper challenges three widespread assumptions about Kant's argument for the antithesis of the Second Antinomy, which is the claim that '[n]o composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing simple exists anywhere in the world' (A435/B463).  The first assumption is that Kant's argument for the antithesis consists of an argument for the claim that '[n]o composite thing in the world consists of simple parts' and a logically independent argument for the claim that 'nothing simple exists anywhere in the world'.  The second assumption is that Kant's argument for the claim that '[n]o composite thing in the world consists of simple parts' is concerned only with spatially extended composite things.  And the third assumption is that Kant's argument for this claim turns on a principle regarding the relationship between the size of the extension of a composite thing and the sizes of the extensions of the things of which it consists. 

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Review of Samuel C. Rickless' Berkeley's Argument for Idealism (forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy)

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Review of David Landy's Kant's Inferentialism: The Case Against Hume (forthcoming in British Journal for the History of Philosophy)

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